Articles Posted in Bronx

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On April 15, 1952 at around 6:30 in the evening, a volunteer fireman in Latham in the town of Colonie, in Albany County fell from the back step of a fire truck and was injured. While enroute to a fire the fireman was riding on the back step of the fire truck. The truck went through a four way intersection that had a saucer shaped drainage ditch in the center of it. The drainage ditch had been installed to correct water run off problem from the private land in the area. The area was very flat and water tended to sit on the surface without running off. The installation of the drainage ditch was designed to improve the problem. In fact, it only partially solved the problem of the water run-off and created a hazardous condition in the intersection of two highways.

When the fire truck crossed over the ditch, the fireman who was on the back stated that he remembered bouncing up about three feet into the air and then he came down into the street and rolled into the drainage ditch. A bystander collected him and took him to a local doctor where he received treatment for injuries to his arm. Later that night, he sought additional treatment from the workers compensation doctor for pain to his chest. The Bronx doctor who treated him stated that he did not remember the exact visit.

In fact, his records of the visit had been lost. He read from his report that he had treated the fireman for chest injuries from his fall from the truck. About six months after that visit to the Brooklyn workers compensation doctor, the fireman began to feel dizzy and sick. He reported to the local hospital where he was found to have a subdural hematoma. A subdural hematoma is a blood clot under the skull bone against the brain. It required brain surgery and he reports that he has been unable to work since the surgery.

The fireman states that the brain injury occurred from the fall off of the fire truck and sought to recover damages. The city disagrees. They contend that the fall from the fire truck was six months prior to the brain surgery and that they see no causal link between the two.

The Supreme Court agrees that the injured fireman failed to show a causal link and due to the time span between the truck accident and the surgery, the claim is dismissed.
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On January 9, 1960 an owner of a gasoline station in The Bronx, New York. On this date, the gasoline delivery truck arrived to fill the underground tanks. There is an asphalt area on the side of the station to provide the delivery truck with a safe location to pump out the fuel. The delivery trucks are not supposed to be on the concrete customer pavilion at any time. While the delivery truck is delivering the fuel, the owner would go out to the customer pavilion to be available in case of emergency since it took about an hour for the fuel delivery.

On the date of the commercial truck accident, the owner of the station was attending to a customer at the service island by pumping the gasoline into the customer’s car. The delivery truck was on the asphalt section delivering the gasoline. When the tanks were full, the driver got in and decided to cut through the concrete customer pavilion section rather than exit out of the station through the asphalt delivery side. He had failed to secure the handles to the bulk box compartment swinging doors on the side of the truck prior to pulling off. In fact, he stated that he did not even know that the owner was out on the customer pavilion and thought that he was still in the office area.

As the truck pulled past the owner of the station, he was struck in the rear end by one of the bulk box compartment doors that were sticking out. The force of the blow spun him around and into the rear tires of the delivery truck. A witness grabbed him and pulled him free of the wheels. This accident resulted in serious injury to the gasoline station owner. A lawsuit was filed by the gasoline station owner against the delivery truck driver and the company that the delivery truck driver works for.

At trial the jury found that the gasoline station owner was guilty of contributory negligence. The Supreme Court on appeal disagreed and stated that there is no evidence whatsoever to find that the station owner was responsible in any way for this accident. He was doing his job in a legal and safe fashion when the Long Island delivery truck left the area that it was supposed to be in and struck him. The trial court verdict was overturned and the case was remitted for a new trial.
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On June 19, 1965, a company truck belonging to a fleet of company vehicles was involved in a serious accident resulting in injuries and lawsuits to recover damages. However, when the Bronx owner of the fleet applied in a timely manner to their insurance company for litigation support and the benefits owed under the policy, they were informed that the particular vehicle in question was not covered under the policy.

A review of the policy showed that although the company owned five vehicles, three of the five that were listed on the policy had different engine numbers than the vehicle insurance policy. In fact, the three vehicles that were listed on the policy were not owned nor had they ever been owned by the company. The company filed a lawsuit against the Queens insurance company claiming a mutual error in the policy and demand for benefits.

The insurance company contended that since the vehicle that was in the truck accident was not listed on the policy that it would not be covered. The court maintained that there have been numerous other cases that have been examined in situation like this. It is more important that the written word of the contract reflects the verbal agreement between the parties than the other way around. Since the intent of both parties was to insure the fleet of vehicles owned by that company, the insurance company needs to make the adjustments to the policy to demonstrate that fact. That means that the vehicles that are listed on the policy, but that are not owned by the company need to be removed. It also means that the vehicles that are owned by the company and not listed on the policy need to be added. In all of the precedent cases reviewed this correction to comply with the verbal agreement between the parties was upheld.

The Supreme Court ruled that since the intent was to cover the vehicles owned by the company and that there is no doubt that this vehicle was owned by the company at the time of the accident, it should be covered. They point out that if one of the vehicles that was listed on the policy, but not owned by the company in question had been involved in an accident that their belief is that the insurance company would have failed to insure it because its agreement was with the company to insure its fleet and the vehicle was not part of the fleet.

It is so ordered by the Justices that the insurance company is held liable to represent the company as the insurer of the vehicle.
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On Sunday, March 28, 1982 a commercial truck accidentoccurred in the Rotterdam Industrial Park in Schenectady County, New York. A part time employee of a transport company rented a truck from a local truck rental company and drove it to the industrial park on that date to collect a load of apace heaters that needed to be transported for shipment the following day. His nine year old son was with him in the rental truck, as was his employer. His employer’s 16 year old son and a friend of his arrived shortly thereafter in the employer’s personal car.

The Bronx employer got out of the truck at the industrial park office. The employee, his son and the two teenaged boys continued to the bay where the space heaters were located. The employee backed up the truck to about a foot or so from the building. He stated that the left just enough room for a person to get by while loading the truck. He then left the truck in reverse, but turned the ignition off. They began to load the truck.

While loading the truck, the employer’s 16 year old son decided that they needed music. He went in to the passenger compartment of the rented truck and tried to turn on the radio. It would not work. He then decided that the ignition must have to be on in order for the radio to work. He turned the ignition key and the truck came on. It lurched backward three times because it was in gear. By that time, the employer had gotten to the location. He jumped into the truck and turned it off.

When the truck lurched backwards, it pinned the employee against the wall crushing his right leg at the knee area. The injury resulted in arterial damage as well. The employee spent the next two and a half years between the date of injury and the date of trial suffering excruciating pain. He suffered pins being placed into his leg, casts, and traction devices. Multiple surgeries, relearning to walk and still the doctors stated that he would have to have the leg amputated. Damages were awarded to the worker in the amount of $1.8 million. The Long Island owner of the rental truck company contends that the amount is excessive and should be reduced.

The court disagreed.
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This is a case between two establishments, a service station and a Bronx flower shop, as well as the insurance companies of each of these two establishments and is about the commercial truck accident, which occurred in the flower shop and in the service station.

The owner of the truck is a couple who has been a regular customer of the service station for quite a long time. When the male owner died, the female owner wanted the truck to be sold for $100. She asked the male manager of the service station to sell the truck. He agreed to do so and went to the residence of the owners to retrieve the truck. Because the car couldn’t start, he towed the car to his service station, all with the permission and consent of the female owner.

After the male manager had repaired the car, he placed a “for sale” sign on the car and parked it on the southern side of the service station. The truck’s front end was facing the northern part towards the flower shop. Te flower shop was adjacent to the service station’s north line. The truck was parked on that area for two to three weeks, before the commercial truck accident happened.

On January 8, 1965, the male manager closed the service station at around 9 in the evening. In the morning of January 9, 1965, the male manager received a call from the village policeman. The male manager went to the service station and saw that the truck had collided with the flower shop. The flower shop’s windows were broken. The male manager called the female owner and told her what had happened so she reported the commercial truck accident to her insurance company. The male manager also reported the event to his insurance company.

The owner of the flower shop filed an action against the male manager of the service station and the female owner of the truck, because of the damages to properties that had happened. The flower shop’s owner claimed that the commercial truck accident was due to the negligence on the part of the male manager in terms of parking the truck. The male manager’s insurance company wrote and demanded the female owner’s insurance company to furnish the coverage of the accident because the male manager was insured under the provision of the policy of the female owner’s insurance company.

However, the Long Island insurance company of the female owner told that of the male manager’s that it would not honor the male manager’s coverage. The insurance company said that the coverage policy does not apply to the service station’s operators, with respect to the accidents that may arise out of the operation. The case went on and decided the judgment against the male manager.

The action made by the male manager’s insurance company is for the judgment against the insurance company of the female owner, for an amount of $1246.97. The amount is for the judgment in the action made by the owner of the flower shop. The whole amount came out of the damages, the defense’s legal expenses and prosecution’s legal defenses.

The policy of the insurance company of the female owner says that the amount paid by the insurance company will be due to the damages incurred and that the damages may include personal injury or damage to the properties.

The policy also defined the term ‘insured’. The unqualified word ‘insured’ may mean the name of the person insured, whether the person is an individual, a spouse or someone who was using the vehicle in the course of the accident, provided that the owner of the vehicle permitted that person to use the vehicle. They are the ones who are responsible for the use of the vehicle.

When the male manager took the truck from the female owner’s residence, with the keys in it, placed the sign on the truck and parked the truck on the service station, the male manager used the truck with the female owner’s permission. This means that the female owner gave her consent to the male manager’s use of the truck. When the male manager used the vehicle, he became a part of the provisions, “while using” and the “actual use”, of the insurance policy. The male manager also became an additional insured, based on the provisions of the insurance policy.

As the male manager became an added insured under the insurance policy of the female owner, the female owner’s insurance company has to pay the amount that the male manager has to pay. This is because of the commercial truck accident happened when he “used” the truck.

Even though the commercial truck accident has already happened two to three weeks after the truck was being parked on the service station, the truck was not moved from the time it was parked there until the morning of the commercial truck accident. There is no evidence saying that someone has seen the accident happening. There is no evidence saying that someone did something on the truck, which made the truck to move and collide with the flower shop, as well. It is also speculation that there is a third party that may have intervened and caused the truck to move from its initial position. There is no evidence saying that an independent act or intervening cause had occurred to cause the accident.

The court found that the commercial truck accident occurred in the flower shop, which resulted to damage to properties, was caused by the male manager’s decision to park it in front of the flower shop on the service station. However, the male manager did not use the truck during the service station’s business operations and the commercial truck accident did not happen during the service station’s business operation, as well. The male manager did not become a part of the policy’s exclusionary provision, as he became an added insured.

The male manager’s insurance company is entitled to receive an amount of $1246.97 from the insurance company of the female owner. The amount is based on the judgment amount paid by the male manager’s insurance company as payment for the action made by the flower shop. The female owner’s insurance company also needs to pay another $1080.85 to the male manager’s insurance company for the expenses incurred in the defense of the male manager in the court trials with cost of interest.
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The Bronx complainant is pleading the Court to release an Order which grants summary judgment on his favor pertaining on the subject of liability. The defendant, however, is in contradiction with his particular appeal.

This specific action is based on the 18-wheeler crash in Long Island Expressway that happened last April 10, 2008. The said Complainant’s vehicle was described as a flat-bed truck, while the offender’s vehicle is said to be that of a tractor-trailer type. It is a good thing that the Complainant’s driver was not hurt in the said accident; however, the defendant who was then driving the tractor-trailer passed out in the event of the said commercial truck ACCIDENT. He was immediately brought to the hospital for medical assistance by the ambulance that arrived just in time.

The complaint was asking for $19,200 total of claims for the alleged rental fees incurred when he opted to rent a truck for a determined period of time while the truck which was damaged due to the accident was still being repaired. No Personal Injury claims were made by both parties as a result of the truck accident.

It was duly established that the road was safe and dry at the time the accident took place and that it was conducive for traveling. Both drivers were also heading eastbound or at the center of the highway. There seemed to be a contradiction between the claims of the two drivers with regard to the traffic condition at that time though. The complainant pointed out that there was just medium traffic; while the defendant claims that there was heavy traffic at that time of the 18-wheeler crash accident.

It was described that the complainant was actually driving behind the defendant’s vehicle for around 5-10 minutes before the accident happened. Then the defendant’s truck suddenly pulled to a stop and supposedly glided to the right of the plaintiff’s vehicle and hit the guard rail which prompted the truck to motion forward in a horizontal direction across the right lane of traffic which hit the center passenger lane of the truck. The complainant’s truck was said to be still heading eastbound towards the center lane at the time of collision which rendered the defendant unconscious immediately right after his vehicle smashed the guard rail.

The defendant who was hurt, bleeding, and unconscious was unable to control his truck so that his truck halted horizontally which subsequently blocked the right lane of traffic. After the said impact, the complainant’s driver still continued to maneuver forward and then consequently pulled over to stop at the side of the road.

It is of standard exercise that summary judgment is only given after due examination of the underlying circumstances as well as establishment that there is limited or no such material issues of fact that could further inhibit one from being entitle summary judgment. This is also evaluated in such manner that is most favorable to the non-moving party; which in this particular case is the Brooklyn defendant.

A party who wants to be entitled to summary judgment should be able to prove a Personal Injury case by presentation of substantial evidence that there is no material issues of fact involved in the accident. It should be further established that there is no evident factual contradiction as to determining the defendant’s liability in account of the said accident.

As a general rule, one has no responsibility towards protecting someone under extraordinary circumstances which has been successfully substantiated by the Plaintiff in this context that there are indeed extraordinary circumstances involved in this particular accident. This was further supported by the driver’s deposition testimony as well as the deposition testimony of the defendant which further stresses that the defendant had some shortcomings during the accident. The defendant admitted that he was not wearing a protective seatbelt at that time. The plaintiff also stressed out that he was driving at a standard speed of around 40 mph and that the first instance that he noticed the defendant’s vehicle was swerving and was having some problems, he applied on his brakes instantly but was still cautious so as not to lose control of his own vehicle.

The burden of proof now rests on the defendant. He pointed out that the car in front of him suddenly stopped and that prompted him to immediately jam on his breaks to prevent collision but he was unable to control the motion of his truck and made him hit the plaintiff’s vehicle. He also further proved that he was neither under medication or alcohol nor was he using any radio or cell phone prior or during the mishap.

Based on the proof submitted by both parties, the jury was able to reconcile the differences and has come up to a decision that there are indeed substantial or material issues of fact pertaining to the truck accident. Thus, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was denied.
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On May 8, 1964, a truck driver for a commercial company drove his employer’s truck to a business on Lake Shore Drive in Oswego, New York. Upon his arrival, the truck was being loaded by a crane operated by an employee of the business with scrap metal. One of the pieces of scrap metal struck the commercial company’s truck driver and causing him injury. After the injury, the commercial truck driver notified the business that he was filing a lawsuit for injuries and damages.

Following the notification of a lawsuit, the business notified their Bronx insurance company. The business’ insurance company then notified the insurance company for the commercial motor vehicle that the victim had been driving. They maintained that the loading of the commercial truck was covered under the motor vehicle policy that was under their jurisdiction. Therefore, the insurance company that was responsible for the damages should be the insurance company that covered the truck. The insurance company that covered the truck disagreed. They felt that it was the responsibility of the insurance company that covered the business, their property, and the actions of their employees. The insurance company for the truck was not notified of the truck accident until eight months after the accident in December of 1964.

The insurance company for the truck applied to the court for a motion of summary judgment on the contention that the insurance company for the business had failed, as a matter of law, to comply with the notice provisions of the insurance company for the truck’s policy. The notice of accident as it applies to that policy states:

‘When an accident occurs written notice shall be given by or on behalf of the insured to the company or any of its authorized agents as soon as practicable. Such notice shall contain particulars sufficient to identify the insured and also reasonably obtainable information respecting the time, place, and circumstances of the accident, the names, and addresses of the injured and of available witnesses.’

The policy also states that “no action shall lie against the company unless, as a condition precedent thereto, the insured shall have fully complied with all the terms of this policy. In short, the insurance company for the truck claims that by notifying the company eight months after the accident, it is not timely as a matter of law and so by reason of the policy, they are not liable. The court maintains that “to grant summary judgment it must clearly appear that no material and triable issue of fact is presented.” (Di Menna & Sons v. City of New York, 301 N.Y. 118, 92 N.E.2d 918). The court maintains that summary judgment should not be granted where there is any doubt as to the existence of triable fact.

The question involved here being if eight months was short enough of a time period to be considered timely under the insurance company for the truck’s policy. The court maintained that following much discussion of timeliness as defined in numerous other cases, that the insurance company for the business should be held to the same responsibility of timely notification that it demands of its own insured’s and that they should be considered co-carriers and not a separate insured person themselves. The court also feels that it is unreasonable in this day and age of ease of information to believe that the business’ insurance company could not have found out what information it was seeking.

In response, the court finds that timely notice was not given and wrote:

‘The finding of the trial court that notice of the accident was given by the representative of third party plaintiff to third party defendant ‘as soon as practicable’ as required by the policy provision is contrary to the proof. Such representative did not use due diligence in 1960 to ascertain the name of the insurance carrier affording coverage to the truck being unloaded at the time of the accident by plaintiff in the main action. Proof of financial security must be furnished contemporaneously with the registration of a motor vehicle (Vehicle & Traffic Law § 312) and any person may obtain a copy of the certificate of insurance from the Department of Motor Vehicles upon payment of the legal fee (Cf. 1942 Op.Atty.Gen. 194). The lack of diligence on the part of the representative of third party plaintiff is emphasized by the alacrity with which the required information was obtained and notice given to third party defendant some two years later when the main action was commenced.’

The court asks if there were any extenuating circumstances that would have prevented the business’ insurance company from giving written notice to the insurance company for the commercial motor vehicle. The answer was that there was not. The insurance company for the business had knowledge of the accident on May 12, 1964 only four days after the accident. The court feels that because the business’ insurance company is an insurance company, they should have known that the insurance company for the commercial motor vehicle was in play. The court then feels that it would only have been appropriate for one insurance company to provide the other insurance company with timely notification.

Because the insurance company for the commercial motor vehicle was not notified by the business’ insurance company in a timely manner, the court decided to grant the motion for summary judgment dismissing the motion of the business’ insurance company that the insurance company for the commercial motor vehicle is responsible to cover the lawsuit. The court finds that since insurance company for the commercial motor vehicle was not notified in a timely manner by the other insurance company, it cannot be found responsible and is relieved of liability. That being said, the court finds that there is no reason to determine if one insurance company should be considered primary and the other secondary. There is only one company that is liable; the company that represents the business where the incident occurred.
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A wrongful death action was filed arising from a car accident which occurred in New York during a early morning in March. Involved in the truck accident was a tractor-trailer driver in the employ of a trucking company. According to sources, due to an electrical problem, the tractor-trailer stalled in traffic in the center lane of the Expressway. The driver got out of the tractor-trailer, walked to the front of the vehicle, and got down on the ground under the truck. While the driver was under the truck, a truck owned by a truck rental company pushed the tractor-trailer forward and onto the tractor-trailer driver’s chest, thereby causing his death.

As a result of the truck accident, the truck rental company filed a property damage claim with its insurance carrier. The insurance company paid the claim and instituted arbitration proceedings against the insurance company for the tractor-trailer trucking company seeking reimbursement for the property damage claim. The tractor-trailer driver’s widow instuted a civil action for wrongful death against driver of the truck and the truck’s owner. The Bronx driver and the Brooklyn truck owner, in turn, filed a third-party action against the owner of the tractor-trailer seeking contribution and indemnification.

The truck company who owns the tractor-trailer sought to dismiss the complaint based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The truck company said the doctrine bars the truck driver and the truck owner from seeking indemnification and contribution because its responsibility for the accident was previously litigated in the property damage arbitration proceeding instituted by the rental truck company’s insurance carrier. The tractor-trailer truck company said the truck driver and the truck owner are bound by the finding of the arbitrator that the tractor-trailer was not negligent, and, therefore, not liable for the accident.

The court explained that the equitable doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, gives conclusive effect to an administrative agency’s quasi-judicial determination when two basic conditions are met: (1) the issue sought to be precluded is identical to a material issue necessarily decided by the administrative agency in a prior proceeding; and (2) there was a full and fair opportunity to contest this issue in the administrative tribunal.

In this case, the court held that although there may have been an identity of issues in the two proceedings, there is no evidence that insurance carrier vigorously represented the truck driver or the truck owner’s interest, or that the truck driver and the truck owner were in privity with the insurance carrier. The court said it was the insurance carrier that had control and involvement in the arbitration litigation. The court said the truck driver and the truck owner had little or no interest in the property damage arbitration and thus, no direct stake in its outcome.
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This is a summary of the decision of the Supreme Court of the State of New York in Nassau County on a motion for summary judgment submitted by BNJ Granite/Cabinets last March 7, 2011. BNJ Granite/Cabinets and Innovative Stone were charged with negligence and failing to provide its employees with a safe work site and working conditions. This negligence was alleged to be the cause of the truck accident in which Michael Tyson was injured.

On January 12, 2009, Michael Tyson of the Bronx was injured as he was working in BNJ Granite’s granite manufacturing business site in Holbrook, New York. Tyson was hired by Innovative Stone to transport two slabs of granite, around 6 feet by 10 feet and weighing 900 pounds, in his truck. The slabs were to be placed on the flatbed of his truck with an A-frame support to hold the slabs in place. The A-frame was assembled by two BNJ Granite employees. The slabs would be then be lifted by a forklift onto the truck and into the frame.

One of the BNJ employees, under Tyson’s guidance, lifted the first granite slab and positioned it on the surface of the truck. He did the same with the second slab when suddenly, it fell from the A-frame into where Tyson was. Tyson had been laying wooden planks on the truck’s base to cushion the granite and prevent it from breaking. The slab landed on both his legs and crushed them. He had to have three surgeries and both legs amputated.

According to BNJ granite, because Tyson was directly involved in loading the slab onto the truck and in guiding the direction of the second slab, he was liable for the truck accident. Tyson argued that in the testimony of the employee who had controlled the forklift, he was not sure if the slab was positioned correctly when he lowered it onto the A-frame. Therefore, since there was a possibility of BNJ’s employee being the cause of the accident, BNJ Granite was not entitled to move for summary judgment. The Court also finds that even though Tyson could have contributed to the accident, there was an element of comparative negligence and BNJ cannot be found completely innocent.

The party which submits the motion for summary judgment must establish first that it is entitled to judgment and must offer enough evidence to show that there are no unresolved factual issues in the case. The other party must then provide evidence that there are still unresolved factual issues.

Now, let’s discuss the main charge against BNJ Granite of Brooklyn. An individual suing for common-law negligence must prove that there is a duty owed by the defendant against him, that there was a breach of that duty, and that that breach caused the injury. In order to see whether the defendant has a duty against the prosecutor, the court checks whether the relationship gives rise to a duty of care and whether the harm could have been foreseen.

Even where there is no original duty, if the defendant performs an act for the benefit of the prosecutor, it must be done carefully and with the safety of the prosecutor in mind. In this case, even though there was no original duty owed to him by BNJ Granite, the company loaded the granite onto the truck for Tyson’s benefit. Its employee was aware that Tyson was at the back of the truck and should have been more careful in loading the slabs, considering their size and weight.

Now that BNJ Granite’s duty to Tyson has been established, it must show that the breach of this duty was not the direct cause of the truck accident that led to Tyson’s injuries. In this matter however there are triable issues as to whether the employee was negligent in loading the slab and whether this negligence caused the accident. Because the accident happened very quickly, neither the employee nor Tyson remembered the facts and circumstances surrounding it. In instances like this, the truth of the issues are usually determined through a trial and cannot be decided on in a summary judgment. The Court therefore denied BNJ’s Granite motion for a summary judgment.
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One afternoon, a 35-year old Brooklyn woman met a car accident. Her vehicle was struck in the rear by a truck. The truckwas not immediately identified because it hurriedly left the scene of the accident. According to sources, the woman suffered personal injuries as a result of that accident. To recover damages for the car and her injuries, the woman filed an action against the insurance company who provided insurance to her vehicle. Under the insurance policy, the insurance company agreed to pay for some injuries caused by an truck accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a Supplementary Uninsured Automobile.

According to the police report, the Bronx truck that hit the woman’s car had a New York license plate. A DMV printout indicated the truck that hit the woman’s car was insured. The insurer of the truck, however, denied any liability and contended that the driver of the truck was not involved in the accident.

Arbitration on the case began. The insurer of the woman’s vehicle, however, sought to have arbitration permanently stayed alleging that the opposing side has failed to furnish sufficient evidence to support their allegation that the offending vehicle was uninsured at the date of the accident. The insurance company also alleged that it is not liable for the injuries suffered by the woman and the damages sustained by the car because the accident did not arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the car. The insurance company maintained that it does not have an obligation to pay under the insurance because the truck caused the accident and its resulting injuries and damages.

In this case, records showed that the insurer of the woman’s vehicle has not provided sufficient evidence to show that the “offending vehicle” was insured to justify a permanent stay of arbitration. The court said the arbitration cannot be stayed because there is an issue, based on the records in court, that the truck was involved in the accident, that the truck hit the woman’s vehicle, and a result the woman suffered from personal injuries.

The records showed that police report together with the DMV print out indicate that the truck was the hit and run vehicle and that it was insured. Yet, although it is admitted that the offending vehicle was insured, the insurance company denied the truck’s involvement in the accident and it has presented evidence that an inspection of the offending vehicle was conducted that showed he was not involved.

The court granted a temporary stay of the arbitration to first determine whether the truck was indeed involved in the accident. This question, the court said, must first be answered before any ruling on whether the insurance companies of both the offending vehicle and the woman’s vehicle are liable for the personal injuries sustained by the woman.
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