Articles Posted in Brooklyn

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On April 15, 1952 at around 6:30 in the evening, a volunteer fireman in Latham in the town of Colonie, in Albany County fell from the back step of a fire truck and was injured. While enroute to a fire the fireman was riding on the back step of the fire truck. The truck went through a four way intersection that had a saucer shaped drainage ditch in the center of it. The drainage ditch had been installed to correct water run off problem from the private land in the area. The area was very flat and water tended to sit on the surface without running off. The installation of the drainage ditch was designed to improve the problem. In fact, it only partially solved the problem of the water run-off and created a hazardous condition in the intersection of two highways.

When the fire truck crossed over the ditch, the fireman who was on the back stated that he remembered bouncing up about three feet into the air and then he came down into the street and rolled into the drainage ditch. A bystander collected him and took him to a local doctor where he received treatment for injuries to his arm. Later that night, he sought additional treatment from the workers compensation doctor for pain to his chest. The Bronx doctor who treated him stated that he did not remember the exact visit.

In fact, his records of the visit had been lost. He read from his report that he had treated the fireman for chest injuries from his fall from the truck. About six months after that visit to the Brooklyn workers compensation doctor, the fireman began to feel dizzy and sick. He reported to the local hospital where he was found to have a subdural hematoma. A subdural hematoma is a blood clot under the skull bone against the brain. It required brain surgery and he reports that he has been unable to work since the surgery.

The fireman states that the brain injury occurred from the fall off of the fire truck and sought to recover damages. The city disagrees. They contend that the fall from the fire truck was six months prior to the brain surgery and that they see no causal link between the two.

The Supreme Court agrees that the injured fireman failed to show a causal link and due to the time span between the truck accident and the surgery, the claim is dismissed.
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Defendant Hartford Fire Insurance Company (Hartford Co.) motions an order, in pursuit of CPLR 3212, which aims to dismiss the complaints of a truck driver and his wife, plaintiffs, on the specific ground that plaintiff is not actually insured under that of Hartford Co.’s insurance product and that he was not in fact an occupant of the insured truck at the time that the commercial truck accident happened. The Manhattan plaintiffs contradicted Hartford Co.’s expressed motion for summary judgment and made a cross motion for an order in pursuit of CPLR 3212, which purports to grant them summary judgment on the grounds of liability and goes down into the actual computation of damages and consequently in aid of NYCRR 60-2.3, which deems Hartford Co. to have given due consent in the aforesaid action amounting to a total of $25,000.

The aforesaid instant action is geared on uninsured motorist benefits wanted by the complainant in lieu with the said motor vehicle accident which took place on May 13, 2004 when the plaintiff, who stood outside of the delivery truck that he used for his job on making beer deliveries to various establishments, was suddenly hit by a box truck and was injured as he was pushed in between the box truck and his own delivery truck in the 18-wheeler crash. Following the aforesaid accident, Countrywide Insurance, the insurance carrier for the owner of the box truck, offered the full policy payment amounting to that of $25,000 to plaintiff. Subsequently, in accordance to filing a demand for settlement, the plaintiff then filed the aid instant lawsuit which seeks to recover underinsured motorist benefits that is under the SUM certification of the said policy which was issued by Hartford Co. to the employer of the complainant, Windmill Distributing Company, LP, which is doing business under the name of Phoenix Beverages, Inc. (Phoenix), that actually insured the said delivery truck which the plaintiff used in order to make deliveries. The Hartford Co. Policy actually provides underinsured motorist benefits which amounts to $1 million to the insured person as well as to any other occupant of a motor vehicle that is supposedly insured for SUM on the said policy.
In the statement given, the plaintiff further attested that he was actually newly employed by Phoenix on the day the accident happened. His job routine task at that time comprises of mainly driving the beer delivery truck as well as distributing the beer products to different establishments which includes beer distributors as well as bars. On that fateful day where he acquired personal injury in the accident, he went on the assigned delivery route which he was assigned to cover for a week.

He further stated that his first stop for deliveries was at Europa Bar in Brooklyn, New York. He had a companion at that time, his co-worker who rode as passenger and was helping him in his beer deliveries.

The truck has a standard size of about 25 to 30 feet long. The beer products which need to be delivered were placed in 12 separate bays located in the rear of the truck; each having 6 on both sides of the delivery truck. The bays can be easily retrieved thru six distinct gates that can go up and down simultaneously on both sides of the delivery truck.

The Plaintiff stressed that upon arrival at the Europa Bar, he then parked just beside the bus stop which is located at the right side of Manhattan Avenue. After he has eased parking, he then turned off the ignition, put the hazard lights on, and then went out of the delivery truck. He proceeded to remove the beer cases which was placed at the third bay right at the driver’s side of the vehicle that is situated facing traffic, and then placed the beer cases right into the hand truck. He then carefully closed the door to the compartment and went ahead to deliver the beer cases in his hand truck to Europa Bar. When he arrived at the Europa Bar, he removed the beer cases from the hand truck and then replaced them with the empty beer cases right on the hand truck that he will take back to the delivery truck.

At the delivery truck, he proceeded to unlock and open the third bay and then placed the empty cases on the pavement which he was going to return to the truck, then he discharged full beer cases from the delivery truck, and then placed the full beer cases on his hand truck for the second delivery, after which, he then went on to place the empty cases of beer on the third bay. Upon doing so, he then properly closed and locked the truck.

The plaintiff further retaliates that when he returned to the delivery truck, a police officer instructed him to move his vehicle on grounds of illegal parking at a bus stop. He then positioned the delivery truck right down at Manhattan Avenue and then parked fronting a fire hydrant. And then he went out of the vehicle; in which he made sure to turn off the engine as well as turned the hazard lights on before doing so. He and his co-worker walked back to Europa Bar with their hand trucks and transported the beer products to Europa Bar.

After he was done with his second delivery of beer products to Europa Bar, he then wheeled his hand truck to the direction of the driver’s side of the beer truck. He then unlocked and opened the third bay of the delivery truck and prepared to set the empty beer cases inside which he just got from the Europa Bar. When the truck accident happened, he was not yet unloading the empty cases as he was still moving the empty cases inside the truck to make room for the ones he got from Europa Bar. He was not leaning forward to the bay of the truck when he was doing the arrangements because the bay was full of beer cases and it was absolutely unnecessary for him to lean down because he can reach on to the beer cases even without doing so.

He also said that his co-worker who was helping him out with the deliveries was still at the Europa Bar when the accident occurred. When he was hit by the box truck that apparently made the plaintiff forcibly pushed forward, dragged about 10 to 12 feet and he was pitted in between the truck box and his delivery truck.

The specific policy included that a person insured is described to be as follows;

• The person as the name insured and his or her spouse who are cohabiting the same house • Pertains to another occupant of the insured vehicle at the time of the accident • A vehicle duly insured for SUM under a specified policy coverage • Any other type of motor vehicle that is being managed or operated by both you and your spouse
Hence, term “occupying” in relation to the subject SUM endorsement pertains to the act of entering or exiting by the plaintiff from the insured vehicle.

In congruence to its motion for summary judgment which seeks to dismiss the complaint of the plaintiff, Hartford Co. stresses that the said plaintiff was not in fact an occupant of the insured delivery truck at the time the accident took place. Further, Hartford Co. pointed out that the plaintiff already completely vacated or exited the insured delivery truck and was deemed away from the insured vehicle for a long duration of time as plaintiff and co-worker were busy with transporting beer products to Europa Bar as well as returning with the empty beer cases in the hand truck back to the delivery truck in situ. Thus, Hartford Co. states that the plaintiff’s mere brief contact with the insured vehicle while returning the empty beer cases into the bay right at the truck rear could not be considered as still being an occupant of the truck at which time the truck accident happened.

In lieu with his contradiction to that of Hartford Co.’s appeal for summary judgment and also his own cross-motion for summary judgment basing on the issues of liability, said plaintiff hands over a sworn statement which discusses the following statements in detail.

That on May 13, the plaintiff was driving the delivery truck that is owned by his employer, Phoenix, wherein he has to make rounds of deliveries of beer products to varied customers of Phoenix which includes beer establishments as well as bars. He then managed to park the delivery truck near their first stop, the Europa Bar. Further, the plaintiff adds that his departures from the delivery truck, while he was making beer deliveries as well as returning the empty beer cases into the truck, were very brief as he has every intention to immediately return to the delivery truck due to the fact that he still has lots of deliveries to do at that particular day.

He stated that he was out of his truck for just 10 minutes during the second round of deliveries that he made to Europa Bar. He then returned immediately to the delivery truck and he was moving and arranging the empty beer cases so as to make sufficient room for the other beer cans that he was going to put into the third cargo bay of the delivery truck. While he was doing this; his upper torso was actually inside the delivery truck while his feet stood firm on the ground and his hands were in direct contact with the beer cans inside the truck.

As he was busy making room inside the truck in order to place the empty beer cases inside, he was unknowingly hit at the back with the box truck. His body was pushed in a forward motion and was pinned right in between that of the box truck and the delivery truck that he was driving. Moreover, the plaintiff purports that he was indeed occupying the beer truck at that significant point in time wherein the accident occurred as he was in direct contact with the truck and his connection with it has not been blatantly terminated.

Additionally, the plaintiff contests that Hartford Co. should be prevented from denying him his SUM coverage that he deserves on specific grounds that the latter failed to serve a disclaimer in lieu with the claim for benefits that that the plaintiff has filed. Furthermore, the plaintiff also contends that Hartford Co. should be considered as to have given due consent to that of the settlement of underlying claim which was served between the plaintiff and that of the insurer for the third-party which amounts to a total of $25,000 because apparently the plaintiff’s legal counsel informed Hartford Co., in pursuit of 11 NYCRR 60-2.3, that Countrywide Insurance Company, which stands as the insurer for the third-party, had ultimately presented the full policy limit payments in the amount of $25,000 that corresponds to the finals as well as full settlement of the said plaintiff’s claim against the stated third party, and subsequently, the counsel did not receive due response from that of Hartford Co. approximately within 30 days after the notice has been delivered.

It is important to note that summary judgment is only granted when there are no given material issues of fact which stands trial. There should also be enough and substantial information to support such claim. After which, the burden of proof is now in the opposing party to produce evidence that could cripple the testimony of the plaintiff and submit the necessary material issues of fact in the court.

After due examination of given testimonies and facts, the court then finds that there are material issues of facts present and thus both parties were denied their claims. However, the court sides with the plaintiff in his claim that he was indeed occupying the said truck because of the fact that his ties with the truck was not severed as he was using it to make rounds to establishments which is a part of his work and considering that there were no previous passengers noted in the said delivery truck. Although as a matter of law they were not able to determine whether the plaintiff can be considered an occupant of the said truck and the fact that Hartford Co failed to disclaim the coverage which makes the said coverage null and void; like it never existed. There were material issued noted upon examination of the deposition of both parties that is why both claims were denied in its entirety.
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The Bronx complainant is pleading the Court to release an Order which grants summary judgment on his favor pertaining on the subject of liability. The defendant, however, is in contradiction with his particular appeal.

This specific action is based on the 18-wheeler crash in Long Island Expressway that happened last April 10, 2008. The said Complainant’s vehicle was described as a flat-bed truck, while the offender’s vehicle is said to be that of a tractor-trailer type. It is a good thing that the Complainant’s driver was not hurt in the said accident; however, the defendant who was then driving the tractor-trailer passed out in the event of the said commercial truck ACCIDENT. He was immediately brought to the hospital for medical assistance by the ambulance that arrived just in time.

The complaint was asking for $19,200 total of claims for the alleged rental fees incurred when he opted to rent a truck for a determined period of time while the truck which was damaged due to the accident was still being repaired. No Personal Injury claims were made by both parties as a result of the truck accident.

It was duly established that the road was safe and dry at the time the accident took place and that it was conducive for traveling. Both drivers were also heading eastbound or at the center of the highway. There seemed to be a contradiction between the claims of the two drivers with regard to the traffic condition at that time though. The complainant pointed out that there was just medium traffic; while the defendant claims that there was heavy traffic at that time of the 18-wheeler crash accident.

It was described that the complainant was actually driving behind the defendant’s vehicle for around 5-10 minutes before the accident happened. Then the defendant’s truck suddenly pulled to a stop and supposedly glided to the right of the plaintiff’s vehicle and hit the guard rail which prompted the truck to motion forward in a horizontal direction across the right lane of traffic which hit the center passenger lane of the truck. The complainant’s truck was said to be still heading eastbound towards the center lane at the time of collision which rendered the defendant unconscious immediately right after his vehicle smashed the guard rail.

The defendant who was hurt, bleeding, and unconscious was unable to control his truck so that his truck halted horizontally which subsequently blocked the right lane of traffic. After the said impact, the complainant’s driver still continued to maneuver forward and then consequently pulled over to stop at the side of the road.

It is of standard exercise that summary judgment is only given after due examination of the underlying circumstances as well as establishment that there is limited or no such material issues of fact that could further inhibit one from being entitle summary judgment. This is also evaluated in such manner that is most favorable to the non-moving party; which in this particular case is the Brooklyn defendant.

A party who wants to be entitled to summary judgment should be able to prove a Personal Injury case by presentation of substantial evidence that there is no material issues of fact involved in the accident. It should be further established that there is no evident factual contradiction as to determining the defendant’s liability in account of the said accident.

As a general rule, one has no responsibility towards protecting someone under extraordinary circumstances which has been successfully substantiated by the Plaintiff in this context that there are indeed extraordinary circumstances involved in this particular accident. This was further supported by the driver’s deposition testimony as well as the deposition testimony of the defendant which further stresses that the defendant had some shortcomings during the accident. The defendant admitted that he was not wearing a protective seatbelt at that time. The plaintiff also stressed out that he was driving at a standard speed of around 40 mph and that the first instance that he noticed the defendant’s vehicle was swerving and was having some problems, he applied on his brakes instantly but was still cautious so as not to lose control of his own vehicle.

The burden of proof now rests on the defendant. He pointed out that the car in front of him suddenly stopped and that prompted him to immediately jam on his breaks to prevent collision but he was unable to control the motion of his truck and made him hit the plaintiff’s vehicle. He also further proved that he was neither under medication or alcohol nor was he using any radio or cell phone prior or during the mishap.

Based on the proof submitted by both parties, the jury was able to reconcile the differences and has come up to a decision that there are indeed substantial or material issues of fact pertaining to the truck accident. Thus, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was denied.
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On August 24, 1950 a truck was involved in an accident that resulted in a personal injury claim. An action was commenced in the Supreme Court of Kings County for review. The elements of this case are that following the accident, the Brooklyn insurance company for the truck contacted the insured person who had been driving the truck and told him that he was not going to be covered in the accident. The insurance policy had been purchased about four weeks prior to the accident and was supposed to be in effect for one year.

However, 21 months after the truck accident and an entire year after the notice of a lawsuit action had been served; the insurance company contacted the driver and informed him that at the time of the accident, his insurance had lapsed due to a suspension and that the insurance company would not be covering the accident. The date that the accident occurred was in the early part of the policy and clearly within bounds of being covered by that policy. The driver of the truck filed a lawsuit to make the company supply the insurance coverage that he had paid for.

The Supreme Court stated that after a review of the evidence in this case, there was no evidence that either the driver or anyone on behalf of the driver authorized suspension of the policy. Further, they could find no one in the insurance company who had authorized a suspension of the policy at any time and certainly not during the time span that covered the accident in question.

In fact, the court stated that the insurance company had already undertaken the defense of the driver in this truck accident. It is unclear why they waited until 21 months after the accident before disclaiming. Since the company still retained the entire premium money which was paid for insurance by the Queens driver, which included the truck that was in the accident. All of these facts support the finding that there was never a suspension in coverage of the truck that was involved in this accident.

The Supreme Court orders that the insurance policy was not suspended and that the policy was in effect. The insurance company is hereby ordered to defend the driver in the action resulting from the personal injury accident in Kings County.

Issues of law are constantly changing. A person who is not specifically trained in the law cannot begin to know what all of their rights are without the assistance of a professional. Here at Steven Bilkis and Associates, we provide Truck Accident Attorneys, Injury Lawyers, Big Rig Jackknife Injury Attorneys, and 18 Wheeler Crash Injury lawyers. Commercial Truck Accident Lawyers will stand by you and ensure that your rights are protected. Wrongful Death Attorneys can argue your side and make sure that you and your loved ones are considered. We make sure that you are rightfully awarded compensation for your suffering.
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On October 31, 1958 a mother was waiting to have her infant daughter x-rayed in a mobile X-ray truck, the truck was struck by another vehicle. The child was injured in the accident. The driver in the commercial truck accident later died. The accident report has to speak for what happened in the accident.

Apparently, the commercial truck driver attempted to move his vehicle which was parked against the curb in front of the place of business. There was an unoccupied vehicle parked behind his truck, and the mobile X-ray truck was parked in front. The driver put his vehicle into reverse and struck the car parked behind him. The bumpers interlocked due to the size difference in the vehicles. The commercial truck driver pulled forward causing the vehicle attached to its bumper to come into hard contact with the mobile X-ray truck that had been parked in front. The impact caused the injury to the infant.

The parents of the infant filed suit in Brooklyn, New York against the driver and the company that employed the driver for damages incurred because of the driver’s actions. They asked the court for an order granting summary judgment against the company and to direct immediate assessment of damages by a jury.

The company that hired the driver made a cross-movement for an order of preclusion because they claim that the parents of the infant had failed to serve a bill of particulars to them after it was requested. Further, they claim that they have no knowledge or information about the nature or circumstances of the accident. They also state that because the driver is deceased and cannot tell them what happened that they should not be held to as a high a degree of proof in opposing the motion of the parents as they would have if the driver was still alive.

The court held that in light of the fact that the incidents and particulars of this case are not the exclusive knowledge of the parents. The facts involved in this case are public knowledge and documented in reports that could easily have been obtained by the company or its representatives prior to the court date. Further, the parents provided the following documentation to the company in their opposing affidavit: a statement allegedly made by the truck driver to an investigator hired by the parents before his death. Because these items were provided to the company, the court presumes that this company had ample opportunity to become aware of the facts of this case prior to trial.

There is no dispute about how this accident occurred. There is no dispute about who caused the accident in that there was only one driver involved. There is no dispute that the actions of the driver caused the injury to the child.

The court finds that there are ample grounds to direct a motion for summary judgment and an assessment of damages for the parents. The court also finds that more detail needs to be provided to the company in reference to particular charges. So the parents are ordered to provide the information to the company within 10 days after service or the motion to preclude will be granted.
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On July 27, 2007, an employee for a water pollution control plant in Brooklyn, New York was at work in an area that was under construction to upgrade the facility. Part of the employee’s job was to provide identification checks on all persons working on the site to ensure that they were members of the Teamsters Union. The water pollution control plant provided him with a Chevrolet Silverado work truck to use while he was performing his duties. On this date while he was pulling up to park the truck, he observed another truck pull in and turn down a temporary road. The employee advised that he got out of his truck to walk down the road to check the man’s union card because it was a nice day. When he got out of his work truck, he stepped onto a temporary ramp that was set up by some of the construction workers on the site. The ramp was constructed of two by four pieces of wood. When he stepped on it, the boards separated and he fell approx. 18 inches to the ground breaking several bones in his foot. He filed a lawsuit to gain compensation for his injuries.

The employee stated in his suit that he felt that the water treatment plant was responsible for paying for his injury because they either knew or should have known that the ramp was in use on their property and that the ramp was not safe. The company disagreed. They felt that they did not install the ramp and that they did not know that it was in use. They did not feel that they should be held responsible for his injury because he was injured by his own fault because he was using the two by fours to walk on. The water treatment plant requested a summary judgment to dismiss all liability against them.

The court disagreed. They stated that the employees’ injuries came from an unsafe condition that was present at the construction site, i.e. the faulty ramp of two-by-fours which collapsed. The question of law is if the plant had actual or constructive notice of the condition of the ramp being used on the premises. The employee does not dispute that the water treatment plant did not build the ramp itself, only that they knew that it was there and did nothing to either make it safe or remove it.

The court finds that there is enough evidence that they may have known that the ramp existed that the case needs to go to trial and that they will not make a summary judgment in this case.
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A wrongful death action was filed arising from a car accident which occurred in New York during a early morning in March. Involved in the truck accident was a tractor-trailer driver in the employ of a trucking company. According to sources, due to an electrical problem, the tractor-trailer stalled in traffic in the center lane of the Expressway. The driver got out of the tractor-trailer, walked to the front of the vehicle, and got down on the ground under the truck. While the driver was under the truck, a truck owned by a truck rental company pushed the tractor-trailer forward and onto the tractor-trailer driver’s chest, thereby causing his death.

As a result of the truck accident, the truck rental company filed a property damage claim with its insurance carrier. The insurance company paid the claim and instituted arbitration proceedings against the insurance company for the tractor-trailer trucking company seeking reimbursement for the property damage claim. The tractor-trailer driver’s widow instuted a civil action for wrongful death against driver of the truck and the truck’s owner. The Bronx driver and the Brooklyn truck owner, in turn, filed a third-party action against the owner of the tractor-trailer seeking contribution and indemnification.

The truck company who owns the tractor-trailer sought to dismiss the complaint based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The truck company said the doctrine bars the truck driver and the truck owner from seeking indemnification and contribution because its responsibility for the accident was previously litigated in the property damage arbitration proceeding instituted by the rental truck company’s insurance carrier. The tractor-trailer truck company said the truck driver and the truck owner are bound by the finding of the arbitrator that the tractor-trailer was not negligent, and, therefore, not liable for the accident.

The court explained that the equitable doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, gives conclusive effect to an administrative agency’s quasi-judicial determination when two basic conditions are met: (1) the issue sought to be precluded is identical to a material issue necessarily decided by the administrative agency in a prior proceeding; and (2) there was a full and fair opportunity to contest this issue in the administrative tribunal.

In this case, the court held that although there may have been an identity of issues in the two proceedings, there is no evidence that insurance carrier vigorously represented the truck driver or the truck owner’s interest, or that the truck driver and the truck owner were in privity with the insurance carrier. The court said it was the insurance carrier that had control and involvement in the arbitration litigation. The court said the truck driver and the truck owner had little or no interest in the property damage arbitration and thus, no direct stake in its outcome.
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This is a summary of the decision of the Supreme Court of the State of New York in Nassau County on a motion for summary judgment submitted by BNJ Granite/Cabinets last March 7, 2011. BNJ Granite/Cabinets and Innovative Stone were charged with negligence and failing to provide its employees with a safe work site and working conditions. This negligence was alleged to be the cause of the truck accident in which Michael Tyson was injured.

On January 12, 2009, Michael Tyson of the Bronx was injured as he was working in BNJ Granite’s granite manufacturing business site in Holbrook, New York. Tyson was hired by Innovative Stone to transport two slabs of granite, around 6 feet by 10 feet and weighing 900 pounds, in his truck. The slabs were to be placed on the flatbed of his truck with an A-frame support to hold the slabs in place. The A-frame was assembled by two BNJ Granite employees. The slabs would be then be lifted by a forklift onto the truck and into the frame.

One of the BNJ employees, under Tyson’s guidance, lifted the first granite slab and positioned it on the surface of the truck. He did the same with the second slab when suddenly, it fell from the A-frame into where Tyson was. Tyson had been laying wooden planks on the truck’s base to cushion the granite and prevent it from breaking. The slab landed on both his legs and crushed them. He had to have three surgeries and both legs amputated.

According to BNJ granite, because Tyson was directly involved in loading the slab onto the truck and in guiding the direction of the second slab, he was liable for the truck accident. Tyson argued that in the testimony of the employee who had controlled the forklift, he was not sure if the slab was positioned correctly when he lowered it onto the A-frame. Therefore, since there was a possibility of BNJ’s employee being the cause of the accident, BNJ Granite was not entitled to move for summary judgment. The Court also finds that even though Tyson could have contributed to the accident, there was an element of comparative negligence and BNJ cannot be found completely innocent.

The party which submits the motion for summary judgment must establish first that it is entitled to judgment and must offer enough evidence to show that there are no unresolved factual issues in the case. The other party must then provide evidence that there are still unresolved factual issues.

Now, let’s discuss the main charge against BNJ Granite of Brooklyn. An individual suing for common-law negligence must prove that there is a duty owed by the defendant against him, that there was a breach of that duty, and that that breach caused the injury. In order to see whether the defendant has a duty against the prosecutor, the court checks whether the relationship gives rise to a duty of care and whether the harm could have been foreseen.

Even where there is no original duty, if the defendant performs an act for the benefit of the prosecutor, it must be done carefully and with the safety of the prosecutor in mind. In this case, even though there was no original duty owed to him by BNJ Granite, the company loaded the granite onto the truck for Tyson’s benefit. Its employee was aware that Tyson was at the back of the truck and should have been more careful in loading the slabs, considering their size and weight.

Now that BNJ Granite’s duty to Tyson has been established, it must show that the breach of this duty was not the direct cause of the truck accident that led to Tyson’s injuries. In this matter however there are triable issues as to whether the employee was negligent in loading the slab and whether this negligence caused the accident. Because the accident happened very quickly, neither the employee nor Tyson remembered the facts and circumstances surrounding it. In instances like this, the truth of the issues are usually determined through a trial and cannot be decided on in a summary judgment. The Court therefore denied BNJ’s Granite motion for a summary judgment.
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One afternoon, a 35-year old Brooklyn woman met a car accident. Her vehicle was struck in the rear by a truck. The truckwas not immediately identified because it hurriedly left the scene of the accident. According to sources, the woman suffered personal injuries as a result of that accident. To recover damages for the car and her injuries, the woman filed an action against the insurance company who provided insurance to her vehicle. Under the insurance policy, the insurance company agreed to pay for some injuries caused by an truck accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a Supplementary Uninsured Automobile.

According to the police report, the Bronx truck that hit the woman’s car had a New York license plate. A DMV printout indicated the truck that hit the woman’s car was insured. The insurer of the truck, however, denied any liability and contended that the driver of the truck was not involved in the accident.

Arbitration on the case began. The insurer of the woman’s vehicle, however, sought to have arbitration permanently stayed alleging that the opposing side has failed to furnish sufficient evidence to support their allegation that the offending vehicle was uninsured at the date of the accident. The insurance company also alleged that it is not liable for the injuries suffered by the woman and the damages sustained by the car because the accident did not arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the car. The insurance company maintained that it does not have an obligation to pay under the insurance because the truck caused the accident and its resulting injuries and damages.

In this case, records showed that the insurer of the woman’s vehicle has not provided sufficient evidence to show that the “offending vehicle” was insured to justify a permanent stay of arbitration. The court said the arbitration cannot be stayed because there is an issue, based on the records in court, that the truck was involved in the accident, that the truck hit the woman’s vehicle, and a result the woman suffered from personal injuries.

The records showed that police report together with the DMV print out indicate that the truck was the hit and run vehicle and that it was insured. Yet, although it is admitted that the offending vehicle was insured, the insurance company denied the truck’s involvement in the accident and it has presented evidence that an inspection of the offending vehicle was conducted that showed he was not involved.

The court granted a temporary stay of the arbitration to first determine whether the truck was indeed involved in the accident. This question, the court said, must first be answered before any ruling on whether the insurance companies of both the offending vehicle and the woman’s vehicle are liable for the personal injuries sustained by the woman.
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Local police accused a dump truck driver of careless driving. The allegations were placed against the Highland Lakes man when he ran a red light and subsequently hit a black jeep, being driven by a 53-year-old man.

The responding police sergeant and patrolman found that both drivers, thankfully, escaped injury.

Traffic was backed up in both directions while the lane was shut down to clean up fuel in the roadway.

The fuel was in the roadway because the dump truck’s fuel tank was damaged causing diesel fuel to pour out onto the ground and into storm drains. The Riverdale Volunteer Fire Department, New Jersey Department of Transportation and Morri County Hazardous Waste experts were on hand and involved in the cleanup process.

The 51-year-old dump truck driver was found to have ignored the red light and charged with careless driving, improper maintenance of headlights and damaged mud flaps.
The truck is owned by Mal Brothers Transportation of Wayne.

Extensive damage to vehicles meant that both the dump truck and the Jeep had to be towed.
A source reveals that running red lights is, obviously, one of the top causes of vehicle collisions. These types of truck accidents are more likely than any other type of crash to result in some degree of injury. They result in almost 1,000 wrongful death suits and about 90,000 personal injury cases.

When choosing to run a red light, a driver is saying that their time on the road is more important than the others and they are also admitting that they think everyone should be watching out for them and not vice versa.

Safe drivers in The Bronx and Brooklyn know that the proper attitude to have while driving is one of defense, obeying all traffic laws, all posted limits and restrictions and watching out for changes in the environment. A policeman says, “The safest driving attitude is not one that says, ‘I must do this and go there – now.’ It is one of ‘what’s the right and respectful way to drive to my destination?'”
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