Articles Posted in Manhattan

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In 1958, a company obtained an insurance policy for a truck that was routinely operated in the course of their business. On day during the coverage of this policy, the Queens business owner’s nephew was driving the truck and caused a commercial truck accident. The insurance company stated that they did not feel that they should be responsible for the accident because the nephew was not specifically listed to drive the vehicle. There is no argument that the nephew was at fault in the accident itself.

The Manhattan company owner argues that the policy itself clearly states that it covers any person who is driving the vehicle. The issue of if the owner had given permission to his nephew to drive the truck was not addressed during the trial of the issue. The policy states that it will insure not only the company owner, but also, any “person while using the vehicle with his permission.” The court points out that “the duty to defend is broader than the duty to pay.” Goldberg v. Lumber Mutual Casualty Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 148, 154, 77 N.E.2d 131, 133.

The court points out that the entire issue of whether or not the insurance company is liable for the compensation that was awarded to the injured parties in this case would have been moot if the insurance company had simply represented the nephew in the first place. If they had done that, then their rights as well as the nephew’s rights would have been protected. Since they did not, the injured parties are allowed by law to seek compensation from the insurance company since the nephew either was not able to pay or simply did not pay the compensation ordered by the court.

The insurance company asked if in alternative, they could receive summary judgment in their favor which must be denied. There is only one disputed issue of fact involved in this case. It is whether or not the owner of the company gave permission to the nephew to drive the truck. A presumption is made that the nephew was operating the truck with the permission of the owner. The insurance company admits that they hold the insurance policy on the truck and that the company owns the truck.

The order of the court in this case is that a summary judgment cannot be approved and the case is reserved for trial.
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October 29, 1954 a Manhattan husband and father of two died because of an accident while he was working for a machine company. On that day, the man was walking back toward his company truck that he had parked a few moments before. He had been talking to some of the other employees and was going back to get into his truck. A few minutes after walking away from them, the other workmen heard him fall and turned around to see the employee on the ground with his hands on his head. He was about ten feet from the rear wheel of his truck.

None of the other employees saw what happened before he fell or even how he fell. There was speculation that he had fallen off of his truck, but no one actually saw him fall. The truck had mud on the tires and wheel wells, the fallen employee had no mud on him. The employee had a fracture to his skull and had suffered a stroke before dying. The issue here is which came first. Did he have a stroke and then fall fracturing his skull or did he fall, fracture his skull and the fracture led to the stroke. The only evidence presented at trial of a fall from the truck was on the attending physician report and that doctor stated that he had been told by one of the other employees that the victim had fallen off of the truck.

The company brought forth medical records from 1952 when that particular driver had been rehired by the company. The doctors who had examined him had recommended that he not be rehired because his health was not suitable for the job. The doctor at that time had diagnosed him as overweight, with excessive hypertension, arteriosclerosis and alcoholism. This brings the concern back to the medical report from the date of the Truck accident that lists the cause of the injury as a fall from a truck. The doctor testified that he obtained that information from other employees. Each of the employees that was present on that date has testified and each one stated that they did not tell the Queens doctor that they saw him fall from the truck. In fact, they each stated that he was about ten feet from the truck when he fell and none of them saw him fall.

Based on this information, the Court believes that the employee suffered a stroke and then fell. The earlier decision and award are reversed and the claim is dismissed.
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The records of the personal injury case showed that an eight-year old child was playing cops and robbers when he was struck by a car directly in front of a building owned and operated by a telephone company. The sources said the truck of the Manhattan telephone company was standing adjacent to and west of a vehicle parked near the easterly curb of the avenue where the accident happened. Thus, within the roadway of 32 feet, at the site of the truck accident, parked parallel, were three vehicles, two near the easterly curb and one near the westerly curb.

Prior to the occurrence of the truck accident, the child ran across the avenue from the west curb to the east curb. Upon arriving at the east curb, he was directly in front of the telephone company building; he then turned to retrace his steps in a westerly direction of the avenue and was struck down by one foot west of the telephone company’s truck by an automobile proceeding northerly. The Queens operator of the northbound vehicle testified that prior to the accident he had stopped for a red light and then made a right turn into the avenue traveling north toward the scene of the accident. He said he observed the double parked truck.

The right front headlight of the northbound vehicle came in contract with the child. The operator of the northbound vehicle said he did not see the child prior to the accident. The child also testified that he did not see the moving vehicle before the accident. The mother of the infant testified that children habitually played in front of the telephone company building.

In the light of the physical and traffic conditions and the known propensity of children to play at or near the building, whether or not the telephone company’s parked truck served to obstruct the view of the infant as well as the view of the operator of the northbound vehicle and thus present a hazard within the range of reasonable apprehension was a question of fact, the court ruled.

The evidence, the court found, does not establish the height, width, shape and construction of the parked vehicles, including the telephone company’s, adjacent to the easterly curb of the avenue. The court noted, however, that the telephone company’s brief concedes that the view of the operator of the northbound vehicle was obscured. This concession supports the inference that when the infant stepped off the easterly curb of the avenue, his view of the northbound vehicle also was obscured by the two paralled parked cars in front of him. The court said it cannot, as a matter of law, state that the infant was not within the zone of danger apprehended by the regulation against double parking.
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On July 2, 1998, the Supreme Court Appellate Division First Department of New York was called upon to decide the issues in a case possibly involving a commercial truck accident. On the date in question, an employee of a property management company was working in a 40 story building that was under construction. It was his responsibility to prepare the stock room and make sure that the tools required to operate the building were at hand. One of his duties was to read the water meters in the building. While he was walking along a sidewalk near the loading dock where the construction deliveries were made, a net that is suspended over this walkway to catch falling debris from the upper stories fell on him causing substantial physical injury.

There are numerous questions of fact as it regards the incidents in this case. Some of the witnesses claim that the accident was caused when a truck delivering glass to the site was backing along the side near where the net attaches to the building. They contend that a handle sticking up from the top of the truck snagged the netting and pulled the net down. Other witnesses state that the company that was hired to keep the debris removed from the net so that the net would not get weighted down failed in their duty to keep the net clean and the weight from debris piled up in the net caused the net to fall. Another theory is that the net fell frequently and was faulty.

The court was concerned with several of these issues. In particular they felt that the fact that the crank handles on the truck were enmeshed in the net following the accident did not demonstrate that the handles had snagged the net. They stated that it was not surprising that the crank handles should be enmeshed in a net that had fallen on the truck covering it.

The injured Manhattan property manager had filed action based on Labor Law § 240 (1) and Labor Law § 241 (6). The Court found that since Labor Law §240 (1) dealt with injuries to construction employees only, and that since the injured party in this case, was a property manager and not a construction worker that Labor Law §240 did not apply in this case. However Labor Law § 241 (6) would.

As it regards Labor Law § 240 (1) was “not designed to encompass the type of routine maintenance work performed * * * which is ‘far removed from the risks associated with the construction or demolition of a building'” (Manente v. Ropost, Inc., 136 A.D.2d 681, 682, 524 N.Y.S.2d 96). The injured party had produced several precedent cases in which to show an applicability of his accident under Labor Law §240(1). However, the court duly noted that some of the cases that the injured party had used as precedent, actually concerned Labor Law 241 (6) and not Labor Law § 240 (1). It is the responsibility of the injured party in cases such as this one to prove that he meets the elements of the Labor Laws in order to invoke their protections. “To invoke the protections of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1) and 241(6), the injured party ‘must demonstrate that he was both permitted or suffered to work on a building or structure and that he was hired by someone, be it owner, contractor or their agent.'” (See, Gibson v. Worthington Div.–McGraw-Edison Co., supra.) Because the record in this case clearly shows that the property manager was not employed or involved in construction work, it limits the Labor Laws that are applicable in this case. His activities on any work day and certainly on the work day in question were maintenance and operational by definition. These activities as remarked in Phillips v. City of New York, supra 228 A.D. 2d 570 held that Labor Law § 240(1) was not designed to encompass routine maintenance work “which is ‘far removed from the risks associated with the construction or demolition of a building’ and that takes place ‘in a non-construction, non-renovation context'” in light of these facts, the injured worker’s Labor Law § 240 (1) claim was dismissed. The Justices also state that his Labor Law 241 (6) claim should be dismissed for the same reason in that Labor Law § 200 is the most appropriate law to apply to the safety issues at this work site. Labor Law § 200 discusses the common-law duty of an “owner or contractor to provide employees with a safe place to work, the application of which is not limited to construction work and does not exclude maintenance personnel, was properly sustained.” (See, e.g., Jock v. Fien, supra, 80 N.Y.2d at 967, 590 N.Y.S.2d 878, 605 N.E.2d 365.)

The issue as the cause of the accident falls in many forms. The most important problem in this case is that no one actually saw what caused the net to fall. All of the discussed theories have some form or another of merit which brings into discussion the liability of each party involved to one degree or another in the use of this net that caused the accident. Obviously, several workers knew that the net was not reliable, yet no one reported this problem up the chain of supervision. Therefore if the net was defective, it could not be replaced and the faulty nature of the net could not be documented.

The next theory discussed the fact that the company that was supposed to keep the debris out of the net was not doing a good job of ensuring that the net remained unburdened by the weight of debris. If in fact, it is proven that the amount of debris that was in the net at the time of the accident was excessive, then liability will fall with them. It is a similar story with the truck lever.

The court rules that there are enough questions of fact to preclude a summary judgment in this case except where it involves the modifications of the Labor Law Statutes that are invoked as previously stated.
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Defendant Hartford Fire Insurance Company (Hartford Co.) motions an order, in pursuit of CPLR 3212, which aims to dismiss the complaints of a truck driver and his wife, plaintiffs, on the specific ground that plaintiff is not actually insured under that of Hartford Co.’s insurance product and that he was not in fact an occupant of the insured truck at the time that the commercial truck accident happened. The Manhattan plaintiffs contradicted Hartford Co.’s expressed motion for summary judgment and made a cross motion for an order in pursuit of CPLR 3212, which purports to grant them summary judgment on the grounds of liability and goes down into the actual computation of damages and consequently in aid of NYCRR 60-2.3, which deems Hartford Co. to have given due consent in the aforesaid action amounting to a total of $25,000.

The aforesaid instant action is geared on uninsured motorist benefits wanted by the complainant in lieu with the said motor vehicle accident which took place on May 13, 2004 when the plaintiff, who stood outside of the delivery truck that he used for his job on making beer deliveries to various establishments, was suddenly hit by a box truck and was injured as he was pushed in between the box truck and his own delivery truck in the 18-wheeler crash. Following the aforesaid accident, Countrywide Insurance, the insurance carrier for the owner of the box truck, offered the full policy payment amounting to that of $25,000 to plaintiff. Subsequently, in accordance to filing a demand for settlement, the plaintiff then filed the aid instant lawsuit which seeks to recover underinsured motorist benefits that is under the SUM certification of the said policy which was issued by Hartford Co. to the employer of the complainant, Windmill Distributing Company, LP, which is doing business under the name of Phoenix Beverages, Inc. (Phoenix), that actually insured the said delivery truck which the plaintiff used in order to make deliveries. The Hartford Co. Policy actually provides underinsured motorist benefits which amounts to $1 million to the insured person as well as to any other occupant of a motor vehicle that is supposedly insured for SUM on the said policy.
In the statement given, the plaintiff further attested that he was actually newly employed by Phoenix on the day the accident happened. His job routine task at that time comprises of mainly driving the beer delivery truck as well as distributing the beer products to different establishments which includes beer distributors as well as bars. On that fateful day where he acquired personal injury in the accident, he went on the assigned delivery route which he was assigned to cover for a week.

He further stated that his first stop for deliveries was at Europa Bar in Brooklyn, New York. He had a companion at that time, his co-worker who rode as passenger and was helping him in his beer deliveries.

The truck has a standard size of about 25 to 30 feet long. The beer products which need to be delivered were placed in 12 separate bays located in the rear of the truck; each having 6 on both sides of the delivery truck. The bays can be easily retrieved thru six distinct gates that can go up and down simultaneously on both sides of the delivery truck.

The Plaintiff stressed that upon arrival at the Europa Bar, he then parked just beside the bus stop which is located at the right side of Manhattan Avenue. After he has eased parking, he then turned off the ignition, put the hazard lights on, and then went out of the delivery truck. He proceeded to remove the beer cases which was placed at the third bay right at the driver’s side of the vehicle that is situated facing traffic, and then placed the beer cases right into the hand truck. He then carefully closed the door to the compartment and went ahead to deliver the beer cases in his hand truck to Europa Bar. When he arrived at the Europa Bar, he removed the beer cases from the hand truck and then replaced them with the empty beer cases right on the hand truck that he will take back to the delivery truck.

At the delivery truck, he proceeded to unlock and open the third bay and then placed the empty cases on the pavement which he was going to return to the truck, then he discharged full beer cases from the delivery truck, and then placed the full beer cases on his hand truck for the second delivery, after which, he then went on to place the empty cases of beer on the third bay. Upon doing so, he then properly closed and locked the truck.

The plaintiff further retaliates that when he returned to the delivery truck, a police officer instructed him to move his vehicle on grounds of illegal parking at a bus stop. He then positioned the delivery truck right down at Manhattan Avenue and then parked fronting a fire hydrant. And then he went out of the vehicle; in which he made sure to turn off the engine as well as turned the hazard lights on before doing so. He and his co-worker walked back to Europa Bar with their hand trucks and transported the beer products to Europa Bar.

After he was done with his second delivery of beer products to Europa Bar, he then wheeled his hand truck to the direction of the driver’s side of the beer truck. He then unlocked and opened the third bay of the delivery truck and prepared to set the empty beer cases inside which he just got from the Europa Bar. When the truck accident happened, he was not yet unloading the empty cases as he was still moving the empty cases inside the truck to make room for the ones he got from Europa Bar. He was not leaning forward to the bay of the truck when he was doing the arrangements because the bay was full of beer cases and it was absolutely unnecessary for him to lean down because he can reach on to the beer cases even without doing so.

He also said that his co-worker who was helping him out with the deliveries was still at the Europa Bar when the accident occurred. When he was hit by the box truck that apparently made the plaintiff forcibly pushed forward, dragged about 10 to 12 feet and he was pitted in between the truck box and his delivery truck.

The specific policy included that a person insured is described to be as follows;

• The person as the name insured and his or her spouse who are cohabiting the same house • Pertains to another occupant of the insured vehicle at the time of the accident • A vehicle duly insured for SUM under a specified policy coverage • Any other type of motor vehicle that is being managed or operated by both you and your spouse
Hence, term “occupying” in relation to the subject SUM endorsement pertains to the act of entering or exiting by the plaintiff from the insured vehicle.

In congruence to its motion for summary judgment which seeks to dismiss the complaint of the plaintiff, Hartford Co. stresses that the said plaintiff was not in fact an occupant of the insured delivery truck at the time the accident took place. Further, Hartford Co. pointed out that the plaintiff already completely vacated or exited the insured delivery truck and was deemed away from the insured vehicle for a long duration of time as plaintiff and co-worker were busy with transporting beer products to Europa Bar as well as returning with the empty beer cases in the hand truck back to the delivery truck in situ. Thus, Hartford Co. states that the plaintiff’s mere brief contact with the insured vehicle while returning the empty beer cases into the bay right at the truck rear could not be considered as still being an occupant of the truck at which time the truck accident happened.

In lieu with his contradiction to that of Hartford Co.’s appeal for summary judgment and also his own cross-motion for summary judgment basing on the issues of liability, said plaintiff hands over a sworn statement which discusses the following statements in detail.

That on May 13, the plaintiff was driving the delivery truck that is owned by his employer, Phoenix, wherein he has to make rounds of deliveries of beer products to varied customers of Phoenix which includes beer establishments as well as bars. He then managed to park the delivery truck near their first stop, the Europa Bar. Further, the plaintiff adds that his departures from the delivery truck, while he was making beer deliveries as well as returning the empty beer cases into the truck, were very brief as he has every intention to immediately return to the delivery truck due to the fact that he still has lots of deliveries to do at that particular day.

He stated that he was out of his truck for just 10 minutes during the second round of deliveries that he made to Europa Bar. He then returned immediately to the delivery truck and he was moving and arranging the empty beer cases so as to make sufficient room for the other beer cans that he was going to put into the third cargo bay of the delivery truck. While he was doing this; his upper torso was actually inside the delivery truck while his feet stood firm on the ground and his hands were in direct contact with the beer cans inside the truck.

As he was busy making room inside the truck in order to place the empty beer cases inside, he was unknowingly hit at the back with the box truck. His body was pushed in a forward motion and was pinned right in between that of the box truck and the delivery truck that he was driving. Moreover, the plaintiff purports that he was indeed occupying the beer truck at that significant point in time wherein the accident occurred as he was in direct contact with the truck and his connection with it has not been blatantly terminated.

Additionally, the plaintiff contests that Hartford Co. should be prevented from denying him his SUM coverage that he deserves on specific grounds that the latter failed to serve a disclaimer in lieu with the claim for benefits that that the plaintiff has filed. Furthermore, the plaintiff also contends that Hartford Co. should be considered as to have given due consent to that of the settlement of underlying claim which was served between the plaintiff and that of the insurer for the third-party which amounts to a total of $25,000 because apparently the plaintiff’s legal counsel informed Hartford Co., in pursuit of 11 NYCRR 60-2.3, that Countrywide Insurance Company, which stands as the insurer for the third-party, had ultimately presented the full policy limit payments in the amount of $25,000 that corresponds to the finals as well as full settlement of the said plaintiff’s claim against the stated third party, and subsequently, the counsel did not receive due response from that of Hartford Co. approximately within 30 days after the notice has been delivered.

It is important to note that summary judgment is only granted when there are no given material issues of fact which stands trial. There should also be enough and substantial information to support such claim. After which, the burden of proof is now in the opposing party to produce evidence that could cripple the testimony of the plaintiff and submit the necessary material issues of fact in the court.

After due examination of given testimonies and facts, the court then finds that there are material issues of facts present and thus both parties were denied their claims. However, the court sides with the plaintiff in his claim that he was indeed occupying the said truck because of the fact that his ties with the truck was not severed as he was using it to make rounds to establishments which is a part of his work and considering that there were no previous passengers noted in the said delivery truck. Although as a matter of law they were not able to determine whether the plaintiff can be considered an occupant of the said truck and the fact that Hartford Co failed to disclaim the coverage which makes the said coverage null and void; like it never existed. There were material issued noted upon examination of the deposition of both parties that is why both claims were denied in its entirety.
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On April 20, 1972 a taxi cab and a truck were both travelling on Second Avenue near 70th Street. The two vehicles collided and the taxi was pushed up onto the sidewalk where it hit a woman. The woman was severely injured and her leg had to be amputated. The jury in the initial trial awarded the woman $800,000 from the taxi company. No compensation was demanded of the truck company whose truck was at fault for the accident in question.

The Court stated that:

‘Whatever version of the accident is accepted in whole or in part, or in combination, the conclusion is inescapable that the truck driver failed to maintain that degree of control over his vehicle and that degree of alertness to conditions of traffic surrounding him, which it was his legal obligation to maintain under the conditions prevailing at the time and place of the accident.’

At the time of the original trial, however, there was a question of facts in the case as to how the accident had actually occurred. The Manhattan taxi driver had stated that he was driving down Second Avenue at about twenty miles per hour when he was struck in the back end by the truck. The force of the impact caused him to go up on the sidewalk and strike the Long Island pedestrian.

The truck driver stated that he was proceeding south on Second Avenue when the taxi driver attempted to cut in front of him from a lane of traffic to the left. He advised that he could not stop his truck in time and struck the taxi. A witness to the accident who was himself a taxi driver at the time of the original accident stated that he saw the taxi cut across in front of the truck. He stated that the taxi caused the original accident. The witness had, however, at different times written two statements about how the accident had occurred and both statements were different from his testimony on the stand.

The witness stated that in the first statement he had not seen the taxi cut in front of the truck but that the taxi was in front of the truck and for some reason the truck did not slow down and skidded into the rear of the cab. In the second statement, the witness stated that he observed the taxi in front of the truck straddling the first and second lanes and the cab was going very slowly. The truck was speeding trying to pass the cab and struck the cab in the rear pushing it up onto the sidewalk.

The attorney then went on to show that the witness had been paid for each of these statements by opposing counsels and that depending on who was paying him at the time, the witness’ statement reflected what they wanted to hear. The attorney for the truck driver then stated that he had refused to pay this witness for his testimony even though he had demanded payment from him just as he had from the others who had paid him for the statements that he had written. This strategy by the attorneys for the truck driver could only make the taxi defendants and the woman look like they had paid for testimony while exonerating the truck driver from guilt in the accident. The witness further stated on direct examination that he had provided the written statements which he admitted were false, because he was worried that the woman would not be able to get sufficient compensation from the insurance company for the taxi driver for her injuries. He stated that he had surmised that by writing these statements that he would be able to improve the woman’s chances of getting an appropriate compensation for her injuries in particular from the insurance company for the truck driver.
Since the trial judge in this case originally set aside the verdict, the Justices cite CPLR § 4404 which provides that after the rendition of a verdict, a judge can set aside a verdict if “. . . upon the motion of any party or on its own initiative, . . . may set aside a verdict . . . where the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, in the interest of justice . . ..’ Such action should not be taken merely because the trial judge would have acted differently but ‘only where it seems palpably wrong and it can be plainly seen that the preponderance is so great that the jury could not have reached their conclusion upon any fair interpretation of the evidence.’ (Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Power Authority, 35 A.D.2d 330, 316 N.Y.S.2d 68.)
Basically a trial judge is responsible to set aside a verdict if it is manifestly a miscarriage of justice and the jury acted mistakenly. The Justices stated that it may be the case that the truck driver has no liability under the ‘true’ facts of the case. The Justices felt that the jury was unable to determine what the ‘true’ facts of the case were, though based on all of the “extraneous and gratuitous” evidence that the jury was permitted to hear in the course of this case which could only alter the fact-finding process.

The Justices stated that they all agreed that the evidence that was actual in this case had it been credited by the jury was sufficient to eliminate any liability from the truck driver. There was only one dissenting comment from one justice. He stated that he felt that if a new trial was ordered that the same outcome could be expected because the jury would hear the same evidence. He suggested that a reverse to set aside the verdict would be appropriate and a stipulation that the compensation should not exceed $500,000 unless everyone stipulated to acceptance of this plan and then the verdict as modified would be sufficient.
The other Justices do not agree with the dissenting view. They affirm the judge’s decision to set aside the verdict.
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One day in July, a the driver of a truck owned by a car leasing company, and leased to a delivery company experienced recurrence of a mechanical problem with the truck in which the accelerator pedal occasionally sticks, does not elevate automatically when the driver’s foot is off it, and which the driver is able to correct only by tapping the pedal with his foot. The driver called the mechanics responsible for the maintenance of the truck who instructed him to drive the truck back into Manhattan.

In the afternoon, the truck was travelling westbound on the Long Island Expressway when the pedal stuck again as the truck was descending an incline. At that point the Expressway curved slightly to the left. The driver looked at the pedal for a moment, during which period the truck swerved on to the shoulder of the Expressway, striking two parked buses. A passenger in the bus suffered very severe injuries to his legs.

The passenger filed an action for damages against the truck driver and the bus companies. The bus companies denied liability arguing that the buses were not the proximate causes of the injuries sustained by the passenger.

The court pointed out that City of New York’s Vehicle and Traffic Law provides that, except when necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic, or in compliance with law or the directions of a police officer or official traffic-control device, no person shall stop, stand or park a vehicle on a state expressway highway or state interstate route highway, including the entrances thereto and exits therefrom which are a part thereof, except in an emergency.

Likewise, the Traffic Regulations provides that stopping or parking or operation of a motor vehicle is prohibited on the berm or shoulder adjacent to a parkway or an expressway except for emergency purposes.

The court ruled that, in this case, the facts point out that the negligence of the bus owners was a substantial cause of the injuries sustained by the bus passenger. The court explained that negligence of the bus owners was closely, indeed immediately, connected in time and space to the injuries sustained by the bus passenger. The court pointed out that the statute and the regulation create a legal relationship between the operators of the bus and other vehicular traffic. The statute and the regulation were designed with an awareness that from time to time vehicles on high speed state highways go on to the shoulder under circumstances that make the presence of standing or parked vehicles a source of danger. It does not matter whether the truck driver in this case intended to go on to the shoulder because of mechanical failure, or to avoid another vehicle, or whether the truck did so because a steering wheel malfunctioned or as a result of driving error.
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In the morning of October in 1969, a 40-year old woman was involved in a car accident and sustained serious personal injuries while operating her automobile eastbound on New York State Route 17. According to sources, the automobile struck a cement brick located on the roadway.

The Staten Island woman filed an action against a company manufacturing split limestone alleging that it had negligently loaded concrete building blocks upon a truck that it owned or controlled, with the result that one or more of these blocks fell on to the pavement of Route 17 and caused the unfortunate automobile accident. The manufacturing company has a policy of liability insurance.

An investigation on the accident was held and showed that prior to the day of the accident, the truck, while heading eastbound on Route 17, broke down a short distance to the east of Binghamton on Route 17. The truck was carrying split limestone, for delivery. The truck was towed to another location and the manufacturer borrowed another truck from a car leasing company. The borrowed truck was the one involved in the accident. The borrowed truck was also insured.

The Manhattan insurance company denied liability and alleged that the borrowed truck had not passed the scene of the accident until after the accident had occurred. However, the investigation on the part of the woman showed that the borrowed truck, loaded with split limestone, passed the scene of the Truck accident before its occurrence.

An action was also filed against the insurance company of the truck involved in the accident. However, the truck’s insurance company asked the court to dismiss the complaint saying it did not know or was not notified of the accident or the facts of the accident. The woman also said she did not know that the truck was insured.

The court found that the woman, being primarily involved in the accident, had the responsibility to inquire as to the existence of insurance coverage as soon as she knew that the truck involved in the truck accident was insured. The court ruled that the woman cannot be excused for failing to know that if any truck under the control of the manufacturing company was involved in the accident, it had to be the truck borrowed from a leasing company. The woman’s failure to notify the leasing company and its insurer of their potential liability so they could conduct their own investigation until almost 13 months later constitutes a violation of the notice conditions of the policy as matter of law.

The court pointed out that an insurance policy requirement that notice be given as soon as practicable requires that notice be given within a reasonable time, and failure to give such notice, it is well settled, vitiates the contracts as to both the insured and the party recovering a judgment against the insured.
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One August, on the Manhattan Bridge, two trucks collided head-on. According to sources, the day was rainy and the road surface slippery. The roadway was constructed of steel-ribbing with recessed concrete fill, adding to the slipperiness of the surface. As a result of the impact, the driver of one truck was thrown from his truck and sustained personal injuries. The truck driver who sustained the injuries filed a complaint against the driver of the other truck to seek compensation for the damages he sustained.

The driver of the other truck disputed liability and the nature and extent of the injuries allegedly sustained by the other driver. According to the defendant truck driver, he is not liable for the accident and the injuries sustained by the other truck driver because it was not his fault that the accident occurred. He blamed the bad weather, which caused the road to be slippery and hazardous to vehicle drivers. The defendant truck driver also said the plaintiff truck driver did not suffer permanent personal injuries that would cause him to lose his earning capabilities.

According to records in the NYC court, the sole evidence on the cause of the truck accident came from witnesses presented by the plaintiff truck driver. The records also showed that the plaintiff truck driver was involved in a prior accident in 1946. In that accident, he sustained an injury to his back. In the 1950 accident, the truck driver said he suffered injuries to the back, in addition to a fracture of a facial bone. A medical doctor who examined the plaintiff truck driver affirmed that the truck driver indeed sustained injuries as a result of the 1950 accident, but the doctor said the allegations on the facial bone fracture is yet to be determined by further medical exams.

The court ruling on the case said it is settled law in the State of New York that proof merely of the sudden swerving of an automobile from its own lane is not prima facie evidence of negligence or evidence sufficient, without more, to permit an inference that the driver was negligent. The court then observed that a sudden swerve might be due to several causes, including the operation of the automobile, the condition of the vehicle, or the condition of the roadway.

In this case there was evidence of ‘extraordinary conditions’ with respect to the road, namely, the steel-ribbing-concrete construction and the added slipperiness of the surface due to the rain or drizzle. In this case, there is an additional category of probable causes which could account for the sudden swerving of the automobile, namely, the peculiar construction of the roadway aggravated by wetness of the surface. In other words, the proof suggested a skid as strongly as it did a wheel-controlled deviation from the proper lane.
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The body of a 43-year-old mother of two was found by police in an industrial part on the eastern outskirts of Matamata. Officials believe she was the victim of a hit-and-run.
The woman was wearing dark clothing and no shoes.

The suspect was probably a truck driver who is thought to have gone back to see what he hit. The victim’s 26-year-old son said that a truck driver who thought he hit something near where the body was found contacted police. He had turned around to check whether he hit something but said he did not find anything at the time.

He has cooperated fully with police who said he returned to town and reported the incident and his GPS co-ordinates.

The mother of two is described by her son as a free spirit who wanted to be a gypsy but who had gained the reputation of a hard-working provider. She wanted to become a head chef and possibly travel the world.

“Everyone loved her as a worker, they’d been trying to get her back for a long time,” her son said.

“She never asked for much for herself. She cared about other people more than she did for herself. She was really loved.”

The woman’s youngest son said he had just recently enjoyed a few drinks with his mother at a local café; that is the last time he saw her alive. He lives in Putaruru.

The owner of the Redoubt Bar & Eatery in Matamata, where the 43-year-old woman worked, closed the shop for the day Friday when he heard of her death.

A Lawyer based in NY City says that thousands of pedestrians are killed by big rigs every year. If a person gets in the path of a large tractor trailer, it is almost impossible to stop or swerve in time to avoid hitting them. With the bulk of the vehicle behind it, it takes a truck driver a lot longer than other vehicles to stop. “And if a truck driver tries to swerve, it could very easily tip itself over – even landing on top of the pedestrian they are trying to avoid,” the Lawyer from Manhattan explains.
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